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"Spain will be lost from the *dread of liberty*."
SIR F. BURDETT.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S CAMPAIGN.——The moment the *Turtle Patriots* had met, and given Mr. Canning an opportunity of proclaiming the principles, upon which the war in Spain was to be undertaken by us, that moment was it easy to foresee, that Spain would be finally subdued by the French. It was then, that Sir Francis Burdett uttered the prediction, contained in my motto, and which prediction is now in so fair a way of being speedily fulfilled.——It is my intention here to pursue the history of the Wellesley Campaign, being satisfied, that, though fatal to our arms abroad, it may become, if properly exposed to the people, of some use to us at home.——But, first, I must beg the Reader's leave to refer him back to the Register, Vol. XIV., under the head of Spanish Revolution, where he will find, that I was abused outrageously, and even considered as a traitor, because I insisted on the improbability of the people of Spain fighting for Ferdinand VII. and the Inquisition. It is, however, surely unnecessary for me to make particular references; for, during several months, I ceased not my weekly endeavours to convince the people of this country, that to make war for Ferdinand was to do all that in us lay to insure the subjection of Spain to the family of Buonaparté. In every shape did I put this proposition, in the hope, that, in some shape or other, it might attract attention. Why I did it, I know not; for, there was something so absurd in the idea of making war for Ferdinand, that I, or any one, might have been assured, that, with those who were for such a war, reasoning was perfectly useless.——Well, we are now enjoying the natural effects of this war; we are now in the height of the enjoyment of a Wellesley campaign; and let us not suffer any part of it to escape our notice.——I concluded my last remarks, at page 340. We were then speaking of the praises, which Viscount Talavera bestowed upon the *humanity of the French*. We noticed, that, until then, the French had been, by our hirelings, called *barbarians*; and that the new discovery, relative to their humanity, and their tenderness of our sick and wounded, was not only valuable in itself, and especially as coming from a Wellesley, but was peculiarly valuable, as coming at a time when it was so very much wanted.——Since the writing of these remarks; that is to say, since Thursday, the 7th instant, fresh dispatches have been received from my Lord Talavera, which are given us, partly entire, it seems, and partly in *extracts*; that is to say, that, as in the case of the dispatches of the 1st of August, a part of them is kept from the eye of the people.——We will, however, take what we can get. The parties concerned shall not slip through our fingers. They shall not get out of sight. We will have the whole history of this famous Wellesley Campaign in black and white, bearing in mind always, that while we had in our Army-List above *three hundred generals*, this same Sir Arthur Wellesley, this same Lord Viscount Talavera, this same Baron of Douro, was taken from his office of Chief Secretary in Ireland, to be sent to take the command in Portugal; bearing in mind, too, that, of the military part of the Expedition to Denmark, all the merit was given to him; and, always bearing in mind, that the hirelings of the London and country press boldly asserted, that, *if he had been left the chief in command in Portugal*, the Convention of Cintra never would have been made, and that Junot and his army would have been brought prisoners to England. Let us always bear these things in mind; and, let us, as we proceed in the history of this campaign, be very particular in examining into the *grounds of the blame*, which the Wellesleys, or their partizans, throw upon other persons, whether generals, soldiers, or civil authorities.——This fresh batch of dispatches begin with a letter respecting our unfortunate officers and men, who were left in the hospitals at Talavera.——This letter, signed by the new Viscount, and, of course, addressed to Lord Castlereagh, is dated at *Truxillo*, 20th of August, 1809. It is in the following words.

" My Lord—I wrote some days ago " a letter to the French Commander in " Chief, which I sent to him by lieut.- " col. Walters, to request his care and " attention to the wounded officers and " soldiers of the British army who had " fallen into his hands, in return for the " care and attention which I had paid to " *the French officers and soldiers, who had* " *fallen into my hands at different times;* " and that he would allow money to be " sent to the officers; and that officers, " who should not be deemed prisoners " of war, might be sent to superintend " and take care of the soldiers, till they " should recover from their wounds, " when the officers should be sent to " join the British army.—I received a " *very civil* answer from Marshal Mor- " tier, promising that every possible " care should be taken, and every at- " tention paid to the British officers " and soldiers who were wounded; but " stating that he could not answer " upon the other demands contained in " my letter, having been obliged to re- " fer them to the French Commander " in Chief.—Since the receipt of this " letter, Mr. Dillon, the assistant com- " missary, has arrived from Talavera, " having been taken prisoner near " Cevolla on the 27th of July, previous " to the action, and having been al- " lowed to come away.—He reports " that the *British officers and soldiers,* " who are wounded, *are doing remarkably* " *well,* and are *well fed and taken care of* " *—indeed he says preferably to the French* " *troops.*—I propose to send colonel " Walters with another flag of truce, to- " morrow morning, and a letter to the " Commander in Chief of the French " army, requesting that a sum of mo- " ney, which I shall send, may be given " to the officers; and I shall endeavour " to establish a cartel of exchange as " soon as possible."

This is, as I said before, the *tender point.* We all feel it here, except the hireling writers, who would say what they now say, if their mothers and sisters had been left wounded at Talavera. The Baron knows enough of us to make him very anxious to satisfy us upon the score of the poor creatures left behind by him at his viscounty. Hence we have a letter upon this subject alone.——But, what necessity was there for the Viscount to talk of " French officers and soldiers who had " fallen into his hands, at different times"? *When, where, how,* was this? *How many* of them? And *where* are they now? What occasion was there for talking of this? I do not remember to have heard of his ever having made any French Prisoners, a *regular account* of which was given us. He talked indeed of having made " *some* prisoners" in the battle of Talavera; but, he did not afford us any chance of judging of the number. *There* are " *some*"; but, such numbers as this are not worthy of notice; and, besides, why does he not say how many he has in his hands, *now*? He talks of prisoners who have fallen into his hands, at *different times;* but, not a word does he say about prisoners now in his hands; or, about prisoners, taken at Talavera. What can be the reason of this? Let the hirelings answer the question.—— Oh! the British officers and soldiers, who are wounded and whom he left behind, " are " doing REMARKABLY *well*"! Oh! " *remarkably* well," are they? Very lucky indeed! " Dead men tell no tales," or some of these poor fellows might enable us to contrast the facts with the account of this *Mr. Dillon,* the assistant commissary, who, I dare say, knew very well what sort of account would be most acceptable at head quarters. I do not wish to create a belief, that our poor countrymen are suffering more than they are; but, really, when I find the Baron, in his letter of the 8th of August, saying, that, on the 3rd, the wounded at Talavera were in so bad a way, that, under *any circumstances,* it would not have been consistent with humanity to attempt to remove them, I cannot help fearing, that, in so very few days, and, perhaps, few *hours,* afterwards, when Mr. Dillon saw them, they could scarcely be said to be " doing *remarkably* well." On the 8th, when the Baron of the Douro had to announce to us the fact, that he had left his wounded behind at Talavera, he seemed to think it necessary to state every thing he could call to mind, in order to shew, that the step could not be avoided. Therefore, he told us of the circumstance, that the state of those wounded persons was such, that, under no circumstances, would it have been consistent with humanity to attempt their removal. Now, it remains to assure this nation, that these unfortunate people *have not suffered from the leaving of them behind;* and, accordingly Mr. Dillon (assistant commissary) is so good as to bring the intelligence, that they " are doing *remarkably* well!"——But, the *cause* of this well-doing is still more in-

teresting to us; namely, that "they are "*well fed* and *taken care of*;" indeed, he says, "*preferably to the French troops.*" Now, though a late Chief Secretary of Ireland, which place was kept vacant for him all the while he was at Copenhagen and at Cintra, might be asked where he found the grammatical principle or example for saying that people are *preferably well fed* and *preferably well taken care of*, we can understand his *meaning*, which, doubtless, is, that our wounded are better fed and taken care of, than the French wounded are; and, taking this for granted, we cannot enough admire the luck of this nation, in having made such a discovery, just at the critical moment when such a discovery was wanted. The fact, however, is this; that, as Viscount Talavera asserts, upon the authority of one of his Assistant Commissaries, our wounded are taken better care of by the French, than their own wounded are. This is excellent. Well, then, it is not true, that the French are "*Vandals*;" and what the pensioned poetaster, Fitzgerald, has said of them, in this respect, is false. ——But, what say our hirelings upon this subject? I was sure, that they would be pinched by this report on French humanity, made by one of their own heroes. Do they corroborate his statement? No; by no means. They take occasion to utter fresh charges against the French, in this respect; and that, too, though not upon my Lord of Douro's authority, upon that of English officers, made prisoners in Spain.——The *Morning Post*, of the very day when the above letter of the Baron was published, contained the following paragraph.——"*Horrible Cruelties of the* "*French!*——The shocking excesses that "have been committed in Spain and Por- "tugal appear in their recital incredible, "were they not sanctioned by the voice "of *Truth*. A party of ENGLISH OFFICERS, "*captured in Spain*, passed through Tours "a few days ago, on the road to Verdun. "They witnessed repeated instances of "the French troops having *impaled women*, "in a state of *nudity*; of *crucifying ecclesi-* "*astics and monks*, in a similar condition; "of inhumanly *butchering helpless children*; "and of various other instances of savage "barbarities. In Saragossa alone, more "than 60,000 unfortunate objects were "victims of Lasnes's unrelenting and mer- "ciless fury; and these inhuman and "dreadful acts were sanctioned and en- "couraged by the *Imperial Sanguinary* "*Tyger*, whose *callous, cadaverous soul* has "been habituated, for these 15 years "past, to glut and prey on the vitals "of thousands."——So then, there are, it would seem, from this, some *English officers*, who have been *captured*, that is to say, *taken prisoners*, in Spain; though this is the first time we ever heard of the fact? So, so! "Captured in Spain," and passing on their way to Verdun in France? These must, I presume, be part of the "*missing*," of whom Viscount Talavera speaks in his letter of the 29th of July?——And, these English officers saw, we are told, by a most desperately government news-paper; they saw repeated instances of the French having "*impaled women in a state of naked-* "*ness*; of having *crucified* ecclesiastics and "monks, also in a state of nakedness; of "*butchering helpless children*; and, that these "acts are committed with the approbation "and with the encouragement of the *Im-* "*perial* sanguinary *Tyger*, whose callous "and cadaverous soul has been habituated "to glut and prey upon human vitals." ——It was not, then, a *casual* thing; it was not of military execution; it was not of the putting of a town to the sword; it was of "*repeated* instances;" and those by the authority of the Emperor Napoleon; it was of a settled and general practice that these English officers had been the observers. ——Well, be the fact so; but, how does it square with the impression conveyed to our minds by this dispatch of my Lord of Talavera and of the Douro? Be the fact so; but, remember, then, thou hireling, that it is to the care, the kindness, of those who impale women naked, and who, in cold blood, butcher innocent children; it is, remember, thou hireling, it is to *the tender mercies of such people*, that your hero has left our countrymen, the sick and wounded at Talavera.——Such, then, are amongst the consequences of this war for Ferdinand. Let the *Turtle Patriots* (who, it appears, are about to conjure up a pretence for feasts and bonfires wherewith to amuse the rabble and dazzle the eyes of the people in general); let these Turtle Patriots, when they meet again, utter their curses upon the "ferocious French," and then sing the praises of him, who has left his sick and wounded to their humane care. Let them do this; but, I hope, that the nation in general will see the whole thing in its true light; and, if they do, it must finally lead to good.——The next dispatch relates to SIR ROBERT WILSON's defeat, and is dated at Truxillo, on the 21st of August, 1809.—— After this letter, I shall insert that of Sir

Robert himself to the Viscount, dated at Mirand de Castenar, on the 13th of August. Both letters are well worthy of attention.

Lord Talavera's Letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated 21st Aug. 1809.—"My "Lord; When I marched from Talavera on the 3rd inst. with a view to "oppose the French corps which we had "heard had passed through the Puerto "de Banos, and had arrived at Plasencia, Sir Robert Wilson was detached, "upon the left of the army, towards Escalona; and before I marched on that "morning, I put him in communication "with the Spanish General Cuesta, who "it had been settled was to remain at "Talavera. I understood that General "Cuesta put Sir Robert in communication with his advanced guard, which retired from Talavera on the night of the "4th.—Sir R. Wilson, however, did not "arrive at Valada till the night of the "4th, having made a long march through "the mountains; and as he was then "six leagues from the bridge of Arzo "Bispo, and had to cross the high road "from Oropesa to Talavera, of which "the enemy was in possession, he conceived that he was too late to retire to "Arzo Bispo, and he determined to move "by Venta St. Julien and Centinello towards the Tietara, and across that "river towards the mountains which separate Castile from Estremadura.—"Some of Sir R. Wilson's dispatches "having missed me, I am not aware by "which of the passes he went through "the mountains, but I believe by Tornavacas. He arrived, however, at Banos "on the 11th, and on the 12th *was attacked and defeated* by the French corps "of Marshal Ney, which, with that of "Soult, returned to Plasencia on the "9th, 10th, and 11th, that of Ney having since gone on to Salamanca.—I "inclose Sir R. Wilson's account of the "action. He has been very *active, intelligent,* and *useful* in the command of "*the Portuguese and Spanish corps,* with "which he was detached from this army "—Before the battle of the 28th of "July, he had pushed his parties almost "to the gates of Madrid, with which "city he was in communication; and "he would have been in Madrid, if I "had not thought it proper to call him "in, in expectation of that general action which took place on the 28th of "July. He afterwards alarmed the "enemy on the right of his army; and "throughout the service, shewed himself "to be an *active* and *intelligent partizan,* "*well acquainted with the country,* in which "he was acting, and possessing the confidence of the troops which he commanded.—Being persuaded that his "retreat was not open by Arzo Bispo, "he acted right in taking the road he "did, with which he was well acquainted; and although unsuccessful in the "action which he fought (which may "be well accounted for, by the superior numbers and description of the "enemy's troops), the action, *in my opinion,* does him great credit."

The manner and terms of this letter, as far as relates personally to sir Robert Wilson, are very remarkable. "He arrived "at Banos on the 11th, and, on the 12th, "*he* was attacked and *defeated,* by the "French corps of Marshal Ney." Short and dry. Very little ceremony about poor Sir Robert and his troops. "He *has* been "very *active, intelligent,* and *useful,* in the "command of *Spanish* and *Portuguese* corps; "he has (lower down) shewed himself an "*active* and *intelligent* PARTIZAN *well* "*acquainted with the country* in which he "was acting; and (lower down) although "*unsuccessful* in the action which he fought, "the action, in *my opinion,* does him great "credit." This is the sort of praise; it is the style of praise, given to a *guide*; or, at best, to the commander of an escort; or, at the very utmost, to some man of very inferior rank, who accidentally has been entrusted with a command. "A "*partizan,*" indeed! Let us read his letter, and see whether it discovers, either in its composition, or in the acts which it narrates, any inferiority of talent in its writer.

Sir Robert Wilson's Letter to the now Lord Talavera, dated 13 *August* 1809.—"Sir—I have the honour to acquaint "you, that I was on march yesterday "morning on the road of Grenadelia "from Aldea Neuva, to restore my communication with the allied army, when "a peasant assured us, that a considerable quantity of dust, which we perceived in the road of Plasencia, proceeded from the march of a body of "the enemy.—I immediately returned, "and took post in front of Banos, with "my pickets in advance of Aldea Neuva, "selecting such points for defence as "the exigency of the time permitted.—"The enemy's cavalry advanced on the "high road, and drove back my small

"cavalry posts; but a picket of Spanish "infantry, which I had concealed, pour- "ed in on the cavalry a steady and "well directed fire, that killed and "wounded many of them.—The 200 "Spanish infantry in advance of Aldea "Neuva, continued, under the direction "of Col. Grant and their officers, to "maintain their ground most gallantly, "until the enemy's cavalry and chas- "seurs à cheval, in considerable bodies, "appeared on both flanks, when they "were obliged to retreat.—The enemy's "chasseurs à cheval and cavalry ad- "vanced in great numbers in every "direction, and pushed to cut off the "legion posted between Aldea Neuva "and Banos; but, by the steady con- "duct of officers and men, the enemy "could only advance gradually, and "with a very severe loss, from the com- "manding fire thrown on them.—The "Merida battalion, however, having "given way on the right, a road was laid "open, which cut behind our position, "and I was obliged to order a retreat on "the heights above Banos, when I was "again necessitated to detach a corps, "in order to scour the road of Monte "Major, by which I saw the enemy di- "recting a column, and which road "turned altogether the Puerto de Banos, "a league in our rear.—At this time, "Don Carlos Marquis de Estragne came "up with his battalion of light infantry, "and, in the most gallant manner, took "post along the heights commanding "the road of Banos, which enabled me "to send some of the Merida battalion "on the mountain on our left, com- "manding the main road, and which "the enemy had tried to ascend.—The "battalion of light infantry, and the de- "tachment of the legion on its right, con- "tinued, notwithstanding the enemy's "fire of artillery and musketry, to main- "tain their ground; but, at six o'clock "in the evening, three columns of the "enemy mounted the height on our "left, gained it, and poured such a fire "on the troops below, that longer de- "fence was impracticable, and the "whole was obliged to retire on the "mountains on our left, leaving open "the main road, along which a consi- "derable column of cavalry immedi- "ately poured.—The battalion of Se- "ville had been left at Bejar, with or- "ders to follow me next day, but when "I was obliged to return, and the ac- "tion commenced, I ordered it to Puerto "Banôs, to watch the Monte Major road, "and the heights in the rear of our left.— "When the enemy's cavalry came near, "an officer and some dragoons called "out to the Commanding Officer to "surrender, but a volley killed him and "his party, and then the battalion pro- "ceeded to mount the heights, in which "movement it was attacked and sur- "rounded by a column of cavalry and "a column of infantry, but cut its way "and cleared itself, killing a great "many of the enemy, especially of his "cavalry.—The enemy is now passing "to Salamanca with great expedition; "I lament that I could no longer arrest "his progress; but, when the enor- "mous superiority of the enemy's force "is considered, and that we had no "artillery, and that the Puerto de Banôs, "on the Estremaduran side, is not a pass "of such strength as on the side of Cas- "tile, especially without guns, I hope "that a resistance for nine hours, which "must have cost the enemy a great "many men, will not be deemed inade- "quate to our means.—I have to ac- "knowledge the services rendered me "on this occasion by Colonel Grant, "Major Reiman, Don Fermen Marquis, "Adjutant-Major of the Dragoons of "Pavia, Captain Charles and Mr. Bol- "mon; and to express the greatest ap- "probation of two companies of the "Merida battalion, advanced in front, "and of the Commanding Officer and "soldiery of the battalions of Seville, "and the Portuguese brigade. I have "already noticed the distinguished con- "duct of Don Carlos, and his battalion "merits the highest encomiums.—I have "not been able to collect the returns of "our loss. From the nature of moun- "tain warfare, many men are missing, "who cannot join for a day or two, but "I believe the enemy will only have to "boast that he has achieved his passage, "and his killed and wounded will be a "great diminution of his victory."

Partizan, or partizan not, it appears that the Spaniards and Portuguese, of whom our Baron seems to have no reason to boast, really fought, and fought well, too, *under Sir Robert Wilson*, which shews Sir Robert to be fit for something beyond services of a mere *partizan*, one of whose prominent talents or qualities was, being "*well acquainted with the country* in which "he was acting." This letter shews him

to be something more than a person a little above a *guide*; and, indeed, as far as I have had an opportunity of hearing people's opinions, this letter has excited no small degree of regret, that Sir Robert had not filled a *much higher situation in our unfortunate army.* Sir Robert might be "*defeated;*" but, he does not *say* so; nor does he say any thing to justify the laconic sentence in my Lord Talavera's letter: "he was attacked and *defeated* by "the French corps under Marshal Ney." This letter does, in my opinion, contain nothing to justify that sentence. He was compelled to *retire*; he *got off* as fast as he could; and so did our Baron from Talavera, but the Baron no where acknowledges, that *he* was beaten, or "*defeated.*" ——But, the great merit of Sir Robert's letter, is, that it *accuses* nobody; *complains* of nobody; *throws the blame* upon nobody; but, on the contrary, contains high encomiums on the Spanish and Portuguese troops. Now, to me, it is, I must confess, very strange, that the troops of these nations should fight so well, when with Sir Robert Wilson, and that those in company with our army and the Baron, should incur so much blame. This is an observation that must have occurred to every one; and, really, I am persuaded, that most men will look upon sir Robert's letter as going very far towards proving, that, if the army under Cuesta did not behave well, the fault was not *wholly* in that army.——We now come to the last of these letters, which, indeed, is not *a letter*, but an *extract* of a letter. It is dated, like the last letter of the Baron, at Truxillo, and, like that letter, on the 21st of August. Now, *why* should a commander, write from the *same place*, and on the *same day*, two letters to the *same person?* He writes a whole letter about Sir Robert Wilson; but, why not have made it *part* of a letter. Why not have put us in possession of that story along with the other story? Why separate them? Why write *two letters?*—— The reader will say: "Why do you ask "all these questions, when you can see the "reason as plainly as you can see the pen "that is in your hand?" Very true; and it is idle to waste one's time in this way; for, it is absolutely impossible for us not to see the reason for thus dividing a dispatch of the same date into distinct letters——Now, then, let us see this *extract* of a letter, and guess at what we cannot get a sight of.

"General Cuesta moved his head-"quarters from the neighbourhood of "the bridge of Arcobispo on the night "of the 7th inst. to Peraleca de Garbin, "leaving an advanced guard, consisting "of two divisions of infantry, and the "Duke D'Albuquerque's division of "cavalry, for the defence of the passage "of the Tagus at this point.—The "French cavalry passed the Tagus at "a ford immediately above the bridge, "at half past one in the afternoon of "the 8th, and surprised this advanced "guard, which retired, leaving behind "them all their cannon, as well as those "in the batteries constructed for the "defence of the bridge.—The General "then moved his head-quarters to the "Mesa d'Ibor, on the evening of the "8th, having his advanced guard at "Bohoral. *He resigned* the command "of the army on the 12th *(on account "of the bad state of his health)*, which "has devolved upon General Equia. "The head-quarters of the Spanish "army are now at Deleytosa.—It ap-"pears that a detachment of Vanegas's "army had some success against the "enemy, in an attack made upon it in "the neighbourhood of Aranjuez, on "the 5th instant. General Vanegas "was then at Ocana, and he had de-"termined to retire towards the Sierra "Morena; and, after the 5th, he had "moved in that direction. He re-"turned, however, towards Toledo, "with an intention of attacking the "enemy on the 12th; but, on the 11th, "the enemy attacked him, with Sebas-"tiani's corps and two divisions of Vic-"tor's, in the neighbourhood of Almo-"racid. The action appears to have "lasted some hours; but the French "having at last gained an advantage on "General Vanegas's left, he was obliged "to retire, and was about to resume his "position in the Sierra Morena.—On "the 9th, 10th, and 11th, large detach-"ments of the French troops, which "had come from Plasencia, returned to "that quarter; and on the 12th, they "attacked and defeated Sir R. Wilson "in the Puerto de Banos, on their re-"turn to Salamanca.—It appears now, "that the French force in this part of "Spain is distributed as follows: Mar-"shal Victor's corps is divided between "Talavera and La Mancha; Sebas-"tiani's is in La Mancha; Marshal "Mortier's at Oropesa, Arzobispo, and "Navalmora; Marshal Soult's at Pla-

"sencia; and Marshal Ney's at Sala-
"manca.—Distress for want of provi-
"sions, and its effects, have at last
"obliged me *to move towards the frontiers*
"*of Portugal*, in order to *refresh my troops.*
"In my former dispatches, I have in-
"formed your lordship of our distress
"for the *want of provisions* and the *means*
"*of transport*. Those wants, which were
"the first cause of the loss of many ad-
"vantages, after the 22d of July, which
"were *made known to the Government*,
"and were actually known to them on
"the 20th of last month, still exist *in an*
"*aggravated degree;* and, under these
"circumstances, I determined to *break*
"*up*, on the 20th, from Jaraicejo,
"where I had had my head-quarters
"since the 11th, with the advanced
"posts on the Tagus, near the bridge of
"Almarez, and to FALL BACK *upon the*
"*frontiers of Portugal*, where I hope I
"shall be supplied with every thing I
"want."

Here we have "*move towards Portugal;*" we have "*break up;*" we have "*fall back;*" we have any thing but that phrase, which alone could convey a correct idea of the movement in question united with its cause and motive. In the ever-memorable GENERAL ORDER, intended to blazon forth the fame of Wellesley, Victor's refusing to wait for offered battle is called an "*escape.*" But, when this same Wellesley himself, so far from waiting for offered battle, is pushing on as fast as possible to get quite out of the reach of the French, he calls it *moving towards* Portugal; *breaking up; falling back*, in order to *refresh* his troops.——To *refresh* his troops! Is that all? What, keep on marching, day and night, in order to *refresh* his troops? ——But, he is in want of *provisions* also. Well! and must not the *enemy* be in want of them? This does appear to me very unaccountable; that the enemy should be able to pursue us over a country, whence we are induced to *fall back*, merely for want of provisions. If this be the case, let us give up the contest at once, for it is quite useless to attempt to maintain it against an enemy, who can live upon the *leavings* of that which we cannot exist upon.——The Spanish government is *blamed*, in unqualified terms, even in the *extract* which we are permitted to see; and, I leave the reader to judge of the manner in which they are spoken of in the *letter itself.* As to this matter, it is very plain, that a quarrel between the Viscount and the Junta has taken place, or must soon take place. But, it appears to me, that, in whatever degree the Junta are to blame, their neglect can form no justification for our Baron. They may be to blame for not having provided food and the means of conveying it; but, he is still to blame for having moved forward, without having *previously* secured those means and that food. Besides, how does it happen, that he got *forward* so well? We heard of no fault about provisions, until after the Tartar-catching affair at Talavera. Indeed, *how could he advance so far without provisions?* I am afraid, and, to speak my mind, I am quite satisfied, that the Junta are not at all to blame; and, I shall be much disappointed, if it does not finally appear so to the satisfaction of the whole country. He must have known well, very well, that the Junta had but little power and less money; he must have known how difficult sir John Moore found it to get any supplies from the people as he passed along; and, indeed, it requires but very little reflection to be convinced, that, unless you have magazines provided before hand, or are prepared to *make free* with all you find, and even to enforce a discovery of hidden provisions, you ought not to attempt to move a mile in such a country as Spain, and particularly in the part of Spain where our poor miserable army has been. There is no excuse, therefore; and as to the Viscount's attempting to throw the blame upon the Junta, I really do not think it fair, especially as the publication of his dispatch takes place *here*, and not in Spain.——As connected with this, there is a report, stated in the news-papers of the Marquis brother having assisted in producing a very material change in the government of Spain; nothing less, indeed, than the *breaking up of the Junta*, and the erecting of a *Regency*, in the person of the Archbishop of Toledo. This is, to be sure, merely a news-paper report; but, if it should prove true, we may, I think, pretty safely calculate upon a speedy termination of the contest in Spain!——I should here offer a few concluding remarks, tending to shew what this nation has already suffered from having meddled in this contest upon a wrong principle; but, there are extracts of two letters, copies of which have appeared in the London news-papers, that I must not, upon this occasion, omit to notice, especially as, if authentic, they amply account for our being allowed to see only an *extract* of

our Viscount's last letter.——These extracts of letters are of a nature not to be inserted by me, without quoting the print, whence I take them; and therefore I state that they are taken from the *Morning Chronicle* of Saturday, the 9th instant, in which paper they were inserted with a sort of preface, as follows:

"The letters from Lisbon supply us "with little intelligence in addition to "what we have before received. The "packet left the mouth of the Tagus, "according to the log-book, on the "23d ult. At that time there were "very few troops in Lisbon, the de-"tachments having marched, as soon "as they were landed, on the road to "Elvas, to reinforce the army under "Lord Wellington. Previous to the "arrival of the Cork fleet, there were "only three ships in his Britannic Ma-"jesty's service in the port of Lisbon. "These were transports, and on board "one of them the Admiral's flag "was hoisted.—The following are ex-"tracts from two of our letters:

Lisbon, August 21, 1809.

"*Several Officers having arrived here* "*lately without proper leave of absence,* "the Commandant of Lisbon, Colonel "Peacock, of the Guards, in the Gene-"ral Orders of Friday last, says, that all "*Officers who return from the army with-*"*out the Commander of the forces' leave,* "are to be put under arrest; and "further, that in consequence of the "*false and unfavourable reports made by* "*English Officers and privates of the state* "*of the British army in Spain,* that in "future all Officers and privates circu-"lating such *injurious* reports, *are to be* "*immediately tried by a Court-Martial,* "*and the sentence to be put in immediate* "*execution.* It has been said, that the "advance column of General Beres-"ford's army has been taken by the "French. It has been reported these "three or four days, with great confi-"dence, that General Beresford was in "the rear of Soult, and that sir A. Wel-"lesley was advancing in his front, and "that it was impossible for him to get off. "—Sixteen transports arrived here "yesterday from Cork, with 120 artil-"lerymen, and 300 horses.—By a ves-"sel that arrived here yesterday from "Cadiz, it is said and believed at "'Change, that general Stuart, with "English and Sicilian troops, had taken "Naples; and that the garrison were "made prisoners of war.—Paper 23 per "cent. discount.

"Lisbon, Aug. 22, 1809.

"The Princess Charlotte packet "which was to sail this morning is post-"poned until to-morrow morning; the "mail is to be closed this night at eight "o'clock. I have put a letter in the "mail last night, with the papers of Sa-"turday and yesterday. The only "news I have now to add to what I "have said in that letter, is that sir "Arthur Wellesley has been under the "painful necessity, (as he says himself) "of *breaking several Officers for their cow-*"*ardly and inattentive conduct in the severe* "*battles with the French in Spain.* One "Officer, who had the command of a "detachment, *ran away from his men,* "but they were led on by the serjeants, "and behaved in the most heroic man-"ner. He is named in General Orders, "and ordered to be arrested wherever "he is to be found. I am told he has "been seen here, at Lisbon. It is use-"less to name him."

Now, I do not by any means say, that these are *truths;* but, they have been published nearly a week, and have not yet, as far as I have observed, been *contradicted*, either officially or non-officially. ——The Orders, said to have been issued at Lisbon, are, I must confess, a little in the *Calcutta* stile; but, I should hope, that the fact is not so; I should hope, that no such Orders were ever published by a British Officer.——We have long been in the habit of laughing at the "poor "French," for not daring to publish any news; but, if these Orders be authentic, the "*poor* French" may have their laugh in their turn. It is true, that our people are prohibited from publishing *bad* news only; and may vent as much as they please of *good.* Should this prove true, we are, indeed, come to a pretty pass; we shall be pretty fellows to make a bragging noise about *liberty.* Those who spread bad news; accounts *unfavourable* to the British army in Spain, are not only to be put in arrest; are not only to be *imprisoned;* are not only to be put into a state of vile durance; but, they are to be *tried,* and the sentence is to be put into *immediate execution;* that is to say, they are to be punished upon the spot, and, as the crime is one of those not particularly mentioned in the Articles of War, it will, of course, come under the comprehensive description of "*Disobedience of Orders,*" whereon

an officer may be *cashiered*, and a non-commissioned officer or soldier *flogged*. If this does not insure them against *bad news* at Lisbon, it is hard to say what will. But, again, let me express my hope, that this intelligence is not correct, and that things are not come to this disgraceful pass.——In *Calcutta* the poor devils of printers of news-papers, previous to the publication of each Number of their papers respectively, are, or, at least, were, obliged to carry a copy to a person, appointed by the Governor General for that purpose, who, as he reads the paper over, takes his pen, and crosses out whatever parts he does not like; and amongst the articles thus crossed, you sometimes find even *advertisements*, if they contain the *titles of books*, supposed to treat freely of politics. This is an effectual way to guard against *bad news*, as far as relates to the press; and this is what there are *some persons*, who are well known to wish to see established in this country. But, even this is not so tight as what we have just been contemplating; for, this relates merely to the press; whereas the Orders, said to have been issued at Lisbon, extend to verbal, and even private, communications. Yet the Turtle Patriots, fine fellows, are carrying on war for the *liberty* of Spain and Portugal. Once more, let us hope, that this Order has no existence; and that the statement respecting it will soon be contradicted; for, really, if it has an existence, I am half afraid, that we shall be unable to match it in the annals of the administration of any one but Robespierre.——Serious, however, as this subject is, it yields, in that respect, to the other facts, stated, so boldly, in these extracts: namely, that *several officers have arrived at Lisbon, from our army, without leave of absence*; that is to say, that they have *deserted*, and that, too, from the field, when in hourly expectation of being engaged with the enemy: and, further, that *several officers have been broken for cowardice* by the commander of our army in Spain.——One would think, that these facts must be false; and yet, how are we to suppose, that an experienced gentleman, like Mr. Perry, would publish them, as he has done, without accompanying that publication with the expression of any *doubt* as to the truth of the facts? It is hard to know on which side to fix one's belief; but, if the facts are as they are stated, England, surely, never was in a state of such deep and complete disgrace as it is at this moment. We must all hope, that the facts are false; but, if they be true, they ought, without loss of time, to be made fully known to us. The parties *names* ought to be published; and, as to the deserters, theirs ought to be nailed to the several gallowses in the counties where they respectively were born. If they are of the borough-monger breed, or have any Turtle Patriots for relations, we shall, however, see apologies enough made for them; but, let us have the facts clearly established; and, above all things, let us have a list of the *names* and the birth-places of them.——Already, I think, I perceive an attempt to prepare a palliative by saying, that they may have been *disgusted*, or may have been so *harrassed* about and so pinched for want of every *comfort*, that their return to Lisbon was to be expected. *Disgust!* Aye, there is a description of persons, who are very apt to feel disgust at the approach of a battle, or of danger of any sort. And, as to being "*harrassed* "about," it is easy to find *hardship* words; but, did these pretty fellows think, that they were *always* to receive their pay for lounging about our paved streets, and ogling mantua-makers' and milliners' apprentices? *Comforts*, indeed! Are we, then, to pay men in red and blue coats for no other purpose than to wear muff-jackets, giant-swords, glove-wallets, and false whiskers, and to loll about at inn-doors and assembly rooms? No, no; these gentlemen should recollect, that *they were paid a long while for doing nothing;* that they are of a profession, the business of which comes by fits and starts; that they must take the good with the bad; and that they were not enrolled in the army for the *sole* purpose of giving them the public money without any expected return in the shape of service.—All this is said, however, upon the *supposition* merely that the statement of the Morning Chronicle should prove true. Let us hope that it will not. Let us hope, that we are not fallen so low as this, which, in fact, is much lower than any of the nations, whom we affect most to despise.——Before I dismiss this subject, let me once more endeavour to direct the reader's attention to the circumstance of Lord Douro's principal dispatch having been kept from our sight, except an *extract*. The public never should lose sight of this circumstance. The *whole* of the dispatch will, perhaps, come out, when the parliament meets; but, let us bear in mind, that, at present, we have only a part of it, and, of course, only that part,

which the minister chooses to give us.—— We spare not Buonaparté; we abuse him for keeping his subjects *in darkness*; but, how different is his conduct? When he enters upon a campaign, he also enters upon *a series of bulletins*, which, day by day, contain an account of the progress of that campaign, and which bulletins are, without any mutilation, published in all his newspapers.——It may be improper for the government to tell the world *all* that the Viscount of Talavera says; but why not, then, give us *from themselves*, such bulletins as they think proper? Herein consists the deception, that, by giving us *extracts*, they give us what is believed to be *the words of the General*, and which, in fact, are not his words, until they are rejoined to those of his words, which are kept out of our sight. Suppose he were to say, "To-day plenty "of provisions have been sent me for a "couple or three days' consumption;" and the ministers were to suppress all the words after the word *me;* is it not evident, that we should have words that were *not his?* In short, words, like individual letters, are one thing, or another, accordingly as they are combined and connected; and, of course, it is very possible to give us words out of a letter, which words do, in reality, make no part of that letter.——If the ministers would tell us the news in their *own words;* if they would say, "thus and "thus things stand;" then we should know what we had before, and should, at a future day, be able to verify these accounts by comparing them with the real transactions; but, this is precisely what they do not wish us to be able to do.——At any rate I hope we shall look sharp after these "*extracts,*" and if we do so, we shall be able to trace out every fact of importance. But, every thing, relating to this campaign in the Southern Peninsula, is of great importance, especially if we bear in mind *the origin and principle of our interference* in the affairs of Spain. We took up the cause apparently for the express purpose of *preventing a radical change in the government* of that country. We saw such a change approaching; we saw the two kings abdicating the throne, and calling upon their quondam subjects to yield obedience to the Emperor Napoleon; we heard the people of Spain, as distinctly as it was possible for us to hear them, protest against this base attempt to transfer them like a herd of cattle; we heard them, from one end of the kingdom to the other, assert their right to be free, to choose another government; and we heard them dealing out unqualified execrations on their "*late infamous government.*" While this was going on in Spain; while a radical change of the government there was in a fair way of being accomplished, and that, too (from the lucky circumstance of the abdication of the royal family) without any danger of the horrors of civil strife; and, while the people of England hailed the dawn of liberty in that long-oppressed portion of the world; in this promising state of things, the *Turtle Patriots* met, as it were for the express purpose, and from the table at this meeting, the king's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, proclaimed to the nation what they had to expect from the part we were about to take in the war; he proclaimed to us, in short, that the war was to be for FERDINAND VII, who, in spite not only of Napoleon's decrees but of his own abdication, was to be king of Spain, and that, too, while his father was yet alive and declared the son not to have his consent to mount the throne. Soon after this an English *Embassador* was appointed to the court of this king of Spain, who was, in fact, and still is, a prisoner in the hands of Napoleon.——Was any thing but what has happened to be expected? It is notorious, that many of our people have been in danger of having their sides pierced by the Spaniards for pronouncing the name of Ferdinand VII. with approbation. We are not here under any Orders like those, said to have been issued at Lisbon, and, therefore, I will state, that an officer, who was in Sir John Moore's army, *told me*, that, being sent out to purchase mules, he was compelled, in order to avoid being killed, to pull out of his hat the ticket, which was worn by our people, with "*Ferdinand VII.*" upon it; and, that, upon his and his companions (before they were aware of the sentiments of the people) crying out, "*huzza for Ferdinand "VIIth,*" they and the object of their devotion were loaded with execrations. And that, in fact, of all the names he heard pronounced, no one appeared to be so unpopular as that under which we were carrying on the war.——This is the great point for the nation to keep in view. We should not let the failures, or even the miseries, of our armies, efface from our minds the great and original cause of all these calamities and disgraces; namely, the determination of our government to make war for *a king*, and not for *a people*, in Spain. That this cause would produce

such effects as it has produced was very evident to me and to many others; we foretold what has come to pass; but the hirelings, whose sole business it is to deceive the people, asserted that we were instigated by the devil; that we were jacobins and levellers, and wished to see a revolution in Spain, *that the example might extend to England.* They prevailed; or, at least, there existed no where the disposition accompanied with sufficient power, to prevent the war from being carried on for Ferdinand; they prevailed, and, as it is just due, this nation has felt, is feeling, and will long feel, the consequences.——Great things are now, by some persons, expected from what is called the "energy" of the Marquis brother. My expectations are not such. I am, as I always have been, convinced, that for a *choice of kings*, named by others, the *people* of Spain will never fight; and that, unless we have the people with us, our exertions are of no avail.——Again, however, I cannot refrain from expressing my satisfaction, that the concern, the whole concern, in the cabinet as well as in the field, is *in the hands of the Wellesleys;* because, if the thing had not been so placed, we should always have heard some of the base insolent partizans of that family asserting, that the undertaking failed only because they were not at the head of it. The hirelings, the unprincipled conductors of no small part of the press, threw all the blame of the Convention of Cintra upon others than the Wellesley, who had a hand in it, though it was negociated by him. We all remember how he carried that affair off; with what an air the whole of their adherents braved the just resentment of the people. There is *nobody to throw the blame upon* NOW; except, indeed, the Spanish government and armies and people; and, *then*, we come upon the ministry, and say: "What! this was your "*universal Spanish nation*, who were mad "with enthusiasm for Ferdinand?" Let them get out of that if they can. Let them choose the object of their censure. They cannot choose amiss for those, who have disapproved of the principle of the war, and who have no opinion of the Wellesleys.

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION.——There is very little to say upon this subject. That has happened, which, for every reason that can be named, might have been expected to happen, and those, *who approved of the undertaking*, have not the smallest right to complain of the result.——I said, from the first, that, if JOHN EARL OF CHATHAM (as we say, JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH) did not look sharp, some one of Napoleon's new-made Dukes might send him back "with a flea in his ear;" and, if the Earl had not wisely resolved to stop where he did, this would, in all likelihood, have been the case.——The thing will, it is said, cost about *eleven millions of money*, for which I am not at all sorry; and, indeed, the only subject of national regret, connected with this affair, is, the *loss* and the *sickness* of the army and navy, which, if so great as they have been described, is a very serious matter. It is stated, that some thousands of our men have actually died of sickness at Walcheren, and that there are about *sixteen thousand* of them sick. The account of the deaths are truly dreadful. It is to be hoped, that there is some exaggeration in every part of these statements; but, at the same time, there can be no doubt of the loss and the suffering having been very considerable. And, *for what!* What purpose will the expedition answer? What will it effect? How will it alter the condition of any nation or any human being? It will have made some few thousands of unoffending persons in Zealand miserable for life; many it will have destroyed; and it will have fattened some hundreds of English commissaries, quartermasters, staff-people, paymasters, agents, and contractors! It will have *created an immense quantity of patronage*, and will have greatly added to the value of the power of the Borough-mongers. These are the purposes, which this Grand Armada will have answered. Would it not be better, at once, to give those Borough-mongers a certain portion of the national revenues, and leave the king and his servants free to choose their measures and to choose their men?——As to *keeping* Walcheren, which poor Lord Chatham denominates an '*important possession*," it is, I am convinced, little short of madness to think of it. The *utility* of it, if practicable, is matter of great doubt with men more capable of judging upon the subject than I am; and, to effect it would, I am convinced, cost, at least, *ten millions a year.* Less than 20,000 troops, including casualties, would not do. Then there must be a fleet, and both must be fed and watered from England. In short the idea is absurd.——There appears to be much dispute, as to whether Lord Chatham be to blame, or not; and

a great deal of sarcasm has been bestowed upon him. But, really, I can discover no ground for this blame. It is impossible, that he should have acted without orders from home, in the taking of Flushing before he proceeded further; and, besides, I do not believe, that he could have got to Antwerp, *even if he had found Flushing ready captured to his hand.* We were in this, as in all other instances, told lies about the disposition of the people. The Dutch, as we are compelled now to confess, *did not want us.* They did not want to be *delivered.* They were all ready to snickersnee us; and, we have not, during the whole affair, been able to produce a single proof of disaffection towards Louis Napoleon, who appears to be as firmly seated upon the Dutch, as his brother is upon the French, throne. For my part, I should not wonder if this most expensive and calamitous undertaking originated at the suggestion of some of those babbling creatures, whom, in every part of Europe, we have the folly to supply with money; and, who, for the far greater portion are, I am thoroughly persuaded, in the pay, and in the interest of Buonaparté, who could desire nothing better than what we have been doing for several months past.

THE WHIGS appear to be all alive, upon the present occasion. There are reports of *changes*; the happy dog may, perhaps, let go the bone! The Whig Oracle, the Morning Chronicle, has, for some weeks past, been hard at work endeavouring to pave the way for the return of its party, and, as the most likely means of succeeding, it has set about a deliberate attack upon Mr. Wardle, knowing that nothing will be so likely to be received as a peace-offering. *This alone,* if we could forget all their conduct while in power, would be quite sufficient as a proof of what we should have to expect from the WHIGS, who, I am, at any time, ready to show, did more harm, more permanent mischief, to the country, during their reign, than was ever done, in a similar space of time, by any ministry, that the country ever knew. What! and is there a man in this kingdom, base enough, and if base enough, *impudent* enough, to bid the nation look for safety in the hands of those, who *nearly doubled the income tax,* who openly avowed, that they would *make perpetual war for Hanover,* and who had the merciless insolence to tell us *that Hanover ought to be as dear to us as Hampshire!* What! bid us look for help to that set, who did their utmost to deprive us of the very faculty of calling for help. Oh, no! we have, very lately, heard that faction cordially join the other faction in defending those who stood detected in having had a hand in buying and selling places and seats in parliament; through the whole of the shameful scenes, here alluded to, we uniformly found the OUT faction more regardless of the people than the IN faction; and, as to their deeds in *war,* what have they to boast of? But, the main point, at present, is, would they, or would they not, have aided a *revolution* in Spain? It is clear, from all they have, at different times, said, that they would not; and, therefore, why would they have been better than the present set? In fact, does the reader believe, that they would not have done just as this set has done? Did they not, from the first, laugh at the idea of restoring liberty to Spain; And, as to the Wellesleys, were they not as much cherished by the Whigs as by the present ministry?——It is absurd; it is empty nonsense, to suppose, that the Out faction, if in power, would, or, indeed, *could,* do any better than those who now are in power. It is the *system* that is in fault much more than the men; and, therefore, those are fools, who look to any set of men, without a change of that system.——We go on from bad to worse, and this is in the very nature of the system. We see millions laid out upon enterprizes, and we see no good to us, and no hurt to our enemy, result therefrom. If, now-and-then, success attends the act itself, it is pretty sure to be followed by *no beneficial consequence;* and, thus, are we going on steadily towards that period, when we are to see Napoleon with all the force of Europe in his hands to wield against us.——Nothing, it appears to me, can save this country from subjugation by France, but that measure of *Reform,* which, while it gave heart-felt satisfaction to the people, while it put an end to all discontents, would call forth new talents and new energies.——The counsellors of the king would not then be eternally engaged in weighing parliamentary interests; their time would not be spent in the invention of excuses, and all sorts of paltry intrigues; they would have the time necessary to attend to great affairs; and, which is the great thing of all, they would be *free to choose* those persons, who were to put their plans in execution. *When* any such change will take place I shall not pretend to say; but, I am quite certain, that, until it does

take place, any change of ministry must be useless, one set of men being just as good as another, so long as both remain in subjection to the will and pleasure of the borough-mongers. While this system remains, there will, with me, always be an objection to *any* change, general or partial; and that, if it were only for this one reason, namely, that, at every change, the borough-mongers have a fresh dip into our pockets. In short, the people of this country are sick of changes, which always add so greatly to the list of pensions and allowances, without producing any change whatever in their favour. If, indeed, the Whigs (it is truly ludicrous to call the *Grenvilles* Whigs) would give us a specific promise, that they would bring in a Bill for the purpose of insuring a fair Representation of the People; then we might wish for a change; but, so far from there being any reason for us to expect such a measure at their hands, we know that they have been, and yet are, the most loud and unqualified in their abuse of all those who profess to wish for such a measure. Therefore, I wish for no change of ministry.——It is quite monstrous to attempt, at *this day*, to amuse us with a change of ministry. It is as bad, nay to the full, as flagrant, as the invention of THE JUBILEE; but, neither will impose upon the people. A crowd of raggamuffins may be assembled, and, after being drenched in the gin-cellars, may be set to threaten the people in London into an Illumination upon pain of having their windows smashed to pieces; but the sentiment of the nation will remain the same; and so it would after a change of ministry. What! is it possible, that any man can be found imprudent enough to attempt to persuade us, that we shall derive any benefit from a ministry to consist of those, who, last spring, cried out "*make a stand!*" Oh, monstrous! I see nothing that lord Castlereagh has done, that any of those who want him out would not do. They stood by him, they justified him, they voted for him, in the case of Quintin Dick, and why should he not remain where he is?

JACOBIN GUINEAS.——There is a curious dispute going on between two philosophers, one of whom writes in the Morning Chronicle and the other in some ministerial paper, about the *discount upon guineas*, which, it seems, is now openly confessed to exist to what one of these writers calls "an *alarming* degree," though, for my part, I see nothing alarming in it. The philosopher, who writes in the Chronicle, has suggested a *remedy*; and what does the reader think it is? Why, nothing short of compelling the Bank of England to confine its issues to a certain reduced amount; that is to say, to the putting down of its paper altogether; for, the moment it begins to draw in, the whole thing vanishes into its native nothingness. Like the other parts of the system, the paper must go on increasing, or it falls.——This philosopher would fain have the Bank make such regulations as would *enhance the value of money*; that is to say, as would make us pay more to the fund-holders than we now pay, when every reflecting man wishes that we had to pay them less instead of more.——Besides, does this writer imagine, that the *country*-bankers would not make money to supply the place of any reduction at the Bank of England? He seems to imagine, that no paper money is good for any thing except that of *the Bank*, as it is called. But, have we not thousands of banks? Aye, and that make as good money as the Bank in Threadneedle street. Indeed, the Threadneedle street money will not pass only at this distance from London half so well as the money made by our neighbours, and that this writer would have plainly seen if he had been with me, last Tuesday, at Giles's Hill Fair, where he would not have got a hundred weight of cheese for a thousand pounds in the Threadneedle street money. The truth is, that the paper-money makers in the country *are known* to those who use their manufactory; and, what is more, the *estates* of most of them are known. If a contrary wind were to blow away the credit of all paper-money, those who hold notes of their neighbours fall upon *their land*, in default of specie; but, where are those to go, who hold the notes of the manufacturers in Threadneedle street? The country manufactory is not *a legal tender*. Its makers are under no "RESTRICTION," not to pay in gold! Oh, the pretty phrase "*Bank "Restriction!*" How will our sons laugh at this? Nay, what fun shall we yet have with it ourselves! The Bank of England gets a law passed to prevent their creditors from demanding gold for its promissory notes; and then the law that lays "*a re-"striction*" on them not to pay gold for their promissory notes! And, because guineas will not associate with such paper; because a guinea, which has an intrinsic value, will not degrade itself by circulating

in company with such paper, calling itself money, is it to be accused of *Jacobinism?* The persons who take, as well as those who give, three or four or five and twenty shillings for a guinea (it fetched, I believe, only 22 shillings at Giles's Hill fair, owing, perhaps, to the purchase being made in *country* made paper-money) are accused of Jacobinism; but, it is the guinea's fault. It will not *go* for less. You cannot get it to stir without a discount. It feels its superior worth, and asserts it. But, there is nothing Jacobinical in all this; if there be, at any rate, the Jacobinism is in the guinea.——The guinea is now become an object of purchase and sale, and no longer a piece of current coin. No man ever sees a guinea *paid* away, except by mere accident; but, to the comfort of our two philosophers, be it known, that when the *trade* in guineas shall have become well established, which time is, in all probability, at no great distance, guineas will *flock back again into the kingdom.* They go abroad at present only because they *will not circulate with paper-money,* and because they are not as yet a well-known *article of commerce.* When they become the latter, back they will hasten, from all parts of the world; and, indeed, they will do well; for they will *very soon be wanted.* Then, indeed, will be a day for a *Jubilee;* then the people of England may again dance and sing; but, at present, I see no reason for a Jubilee, which, to make the thing complete, is called for by those, who have been most instrumental in driving the king's image and superscription from the land. When his Majesty's picture returns to our dwellings, then will we join in a Jubilee; but until then, let Jubilees, like Turtle Meetings, be confined to those who make contracts and loans, and who bask in the sunshine of "Bank-restrictions."

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 14th Sept. 1809.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*Proclamation of King Joseph, dated Head-quarters, Toledo, Aug.* 19, 1809.

Soldiers!—It is scarcely fifteen days since 120,000 enemies, consisting of English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, who marched from different points, rendezvoused under the walls of my capital; but united on the 26th of July at the bridge of Guadarama, the 1st and 4th corps, and the reserve, defeated on that day the enemy. On the 27th, he repassed in great haste the Alberche. On the 28th, attacked in a position judged unattackable, 80,000 men have not been able to contend against 40,000 French.—From that time, renouncing their chimerical project of conquest, they have thought but of safety, and have abandoned the field of battle. More than 6,000 English wounded are in our hospitals; the least of our corps, the 1st, was judged sufficient to observe and keep in check this army, still so numerous, in spite of its losses. It remained upon the Alberche, whilst the 4th corps, and the reserve, set out on the 29th, to succour Toledo, besieged by the army of La Mancha; and that of Madrid, menaced by the same army, has forced the enemy, already within four leagues of the capital, to relinquish its prey. It has repassed the Tagus in the greatest haste, and flies towards the Sierra Morena, after having abandoned some thousands of killed, wounded, and prisoners. The 2d, 5th, and 6th corps are following the rear-guard of the enemy's army. These corps formed a junction with the 1st corps, at Oropesa, on the 7th August.—The English fly every way, in disorder, and by roads hitherto judged impracticable to artillery. The 2d and 5th corps are pursuing them.—Soldiers, you have saved my capital, the King of Spain thanks you; you have done more, the brother of your Emperor sees fly before your eagles the eternal enemy of the French name.—The Emperor will know all that you have done, he will acknowledge the brave, who have made themselves conspicuous among the brave, those who have received honourable wounds; and if he says to us, "I am content with you," we shall be sufficiently recompensed.

(Signed) JOSEPH.

Royal Order addressed to Senores Don Luis Mendoza, and Don Andres Gonzalez Pacheco, members of this Supreme Junta. Dated Royal Palace of Seville, Aug. 15.

The Supreme Junta of the government of the kingdom have seen, with the most lively interest, the observations which your Excellencies make in your memorial of the 12th inst. on the causes which have led to the want of provisions in the combined army, and the means of remedying this evil; and while it employs the necessary measures for this purpose, it charges me to inform your Excellencies that our

own security and defence requiring that the said army should be abundantly supplied with whatever it requires for its subsistence and operations, chiefly our generous allies, who, fighting for our liberty and independence with the same enthusiasm as they would defend their own, render themselves creditors, both by gratitude and justice, to every consideration and sacrifice of the nation and government. Your Excellencies will use every possible and conceivable effort, in order that the said army may want nothing; co-operating with the commission which his Majesty has given to the Member Don Lorenzo Calvo, and with the intentions of the government, which are directed exclusively toward the welfare and salvation of the country. I communicate this by Royal Order to your Excellencies, for your information, direction, and fulfilment. May God preserve your Excellencies many years! MARTIN DE GARAY.

Answer.

Sire; With the greatest pleasure we have received the Royal Order of your majesty, of the date of the 15th, enjoining us to redouble our exertions for the supply of the English auxiliary troops. We have the satisfaction to inform your majesty, that the inhabitants here supply every thing with the greatest alacrity, and this town contributes 1,000 rations daily, and meal and oats more than could be expected from a country so ravaged by the enemy. We have used every means to collect all the grain belonging to the government of Garrovillas, which is daily grinding in the mills of Talaban. The flour is afterwards deposited on the two bridges in the said town of Garrovillas, in order that it may be in readiness whenever the intendant may apply for provisions. The oats are deposited in St. Jago del Campo, all within the distance of four leagues. If Senhor Don Lorenzo Calvo will send an order, it shall immediately be executed.—We request your majesty to be convinced that our patriotism cannot be exceeded. Provisions are daily arriving, even more, in the opinion of almost every one, than are necessary, this province being as frank and liberal as any other, if not more so.

SWEDEN.—*Message relative to the Pension which the States are to allow to the late King, Gustavus Adolphus, his Queen and children. Dated Stockholm, Aug.* 15.

The period is now fast approaching, when a prince, who lately governed Sweden, but whose claim to the Swedish crown has been solemnly cancelled by the unanimous resolution of the States of the Realm, must absent himself from this country. His own spontaneous wish agrees, on this point, with what the public tranquillity and security require. His Royal Majesty has taken the advice of the Secret Committee on a matter of so much importance, which, however, the state of public affairs does not yet permit His Majesty to communicate to the Diet, and he, therefore, confines himself, at present, to the question—'What pension or yearly allowance, are the States of the Realm willing 'to grant to their late King, his Queen, and 'children?' Which question being answered, another will occur relative to the country which it will be most proper to assign for the residence of Gustavus Adolphus and his family.—His Majesty does not deem it superfluous to add some observations for the States to bear in mind in their deliberations on this subject. The States cannot but be aware, that their decision must bear that stamp of dignified generosity, which becomes a noble-minded nation; that misfortune craves respect; and that humanity itself commands forgiveness and oblivion of the past. His Royal Majesty is anxiously desirous that the States of the Realm, by deciding the subject under discussion on these principles, should meet his wishes, and thus give a pledge to Europe of the purity of the motives which induced Sweden to revise her system of government, and renew the structure of the State. CHARLES.

AMERICA.—*Proclamation of the President to the United States of America. Dated Washington City, Thursday, August* 10, 1809.

Whereas, in consequence of a communication from his Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, declaring that the British Orders in Council, of January and November, 1807, would be withdrawn on the 10th of June last, (and by virtue of which an Act of Congress was passed, entitled "An Act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes,") I, James Madison, President, &c. did issue a proclamation, on the 19th of April last, declaring that the Orders in Council aforesaid would be withdrawn on the 10th of June,

after which the trade might be renewed, and as it is now officially made known to me, that the Orders in Council are not withdrawn, agreeably to the declaration aforesaid, I do hereby proclaim the same, and that the Acts above still remain in force. JAMES MADISON.

FROM THE SPANISH PAPERS.—*Minutes of Dispatches, dated August 14th, and taken on a peasant going to Avila, at Fomescus, by a detachment under Sir Robert Wilson's orders.—(The original sent on to General Cuesta.)*

A Monsieur le Colonel Hays, Governeur d' Avila.—You will give directions that this letter shall be forwarded with the utmost expedition to his majesty, and you will send me your receipt.—Wilson's corps is cut off. About five days ago it was between Candelario and Villa Nueva. If from your town you move a column of 1,000 men, and attack them, they will be compelled to surrender.—I communicate to you the brilliant action of the 8th inst. at P. Arzobispo. We took from the enemy 30 pieces of cannon, 40 tumbrils, with baggage, and 600 prisoners, besides a great number killed. The Royal Carbineers and Corps de Garde were cut to pieces.—Send me from your province, wine, vinegar, and brandy, which shall be paid for in ready money; and also send me news from Burgos, Salamanca, Valladolid, &c.—(Signed.)—DUKE of DALMATIA.

Sire; the orders that you sent me are executed. The duke of Elchingen will arrive to-morrow at his destination, and the parties which have come out of Ciudad Rodrigo will be beaten.—I have the intention of besieging Ciudad Rodrigo. If your majesty sends me five corps complete, and if the duke of Elchingen comes this way, I will attack marshal Beresford's army, which is now between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and, by news now received, between Perales and Gette, and composed of 8,000 English, the same number of Portuguese, and 4,000 Spaniards: but if this is to be executed, it must be done with the greatest expedition, because otherwise the effect of the victories at Talavera and Arzobispo will be lost.—It is probable Vanegas has already passed the Sierra Morena; and, in this case, the second corps may fall upon Cuesta, keep the Tagus, and open the communication with this corps.—Wilson's corps is cut off. It is between Villa Nueva and Candelario; and if a column from Avila, of 1,500 or 1,000 men, should come down, it would be compelled to surrender.—(Signed.)—DUKE of DALMATIA.—Addressed to Joseph, king of Spain, &c. &c. &c.

Proclamation of Marshal Augereau, Duke of Castiglione, &c. to the Inhabitants of Catalonia. Dated Perpignan, July 2.

"Spaniards! Catalans! I am come in the midst of you. His majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy has given me the command of his armies in Catalonia.—Spaniards, I know you and love you. Seduced by perfidious insinuations, unhappy victims and blind instruments of a Cabinet, the enemy of France and humanity, many and many of your brethren are obstinate in prolonging a war, the issue of which could never be doubtful. They deny and reject the benefits and favours which an august Sovereign provides for, and is anxious to shower upon them: an hero whom heaven created, in its beneficence, for the felicity and glory of Spain and the world.—Spaniards, the hero of France loves and esteems you; his virtuous heart requires and needs your felicity. God, who granted to Napoleon his invincible valour, gave him at the same time his goodness and tender humanity.—Napoleon sighs over your afflictions; he has a paternal heart, and as such suffers over the terrible blows which are inflicted upon you, and which will be inflicted still more upon you, by his formidable armies, if you delay long in listening to the voice of truth, and continue in your fatal blindness.—Lay aside useless hopes; a false love and a criminal honour, which, arming against a king who is truly paternal, the august brother of the great Napoleon, irritates Heaven against you, which gave him to you in his mercy. Abandon vain illusions. God protects France, a God walks with Napoleon, covers and shades him with his wings, and enchains victory to his triumphal car.—Brave Spaniards, submit. Europe is submitting and surrendering herself.—Spaniards, I know you, and you have to know me. I have long esteemed you; and when you submit you will find in me a true friend. Yourselves, and your property, shall be sacred for me.—

(To be continued.)

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